A few weeks ago, an old student called me to ask how she might go about getting a sizable raise from her university. "That's easy," I said, "Go get an offer from another department." She said she felt squeamish about it, like it was dishonest or involved "using" another department. Again, my reply was the industry standard: "It's not dishonest. It's how the profession works. And everyone knows this is how the profession works. Don't be foolish. There's really no other way to convince a university to raise your pay considerably."
A few days ago, I got a phone call from a colleague in the Philosophy department of another university inviting me to apply for a position there. The invitation was proposed in such a way as to indicate that, were I to apply, the short list would be pretty much a list of one. But I have almost no interest in moving to that university right now. So I got to thinking... Maybe the student was correct? After all, isn't it a crappy thing to do? By applying to a job I'm not really interest in, I could surely get a hefty raise from my current university, but I'd also be deceiving the people at the other university, right?
Of course, it is the case that our profession is such that getting other offers really is the only way to get considerable raises in pay: the university believes that you're worth only what another university is willing to pay you. So the only way to prove your worth to your current university is to prove your disloyalty to it! Isn't that fucked up?
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I suppose the first place to start is distinguishing the question as to whether this strategy is morally unsavory from the question as to whether it is effective.
To the second issue, I think it's got to be a measure of how deep your current university's pockets are and how credible they take your interest in the other university to be. If they have the means and reason to try to motivate you to stay, this surely seems a reasonably effective means of getting your salary to meet its raising market value. (Though I wonder if you'd like it if the admin shopped you about and got no interest, then *dropped* your salary) Though I'd bet that it must have diminishing returns -- if you regularly do this, wouldn't the admin eventually just say it's too much trouble to keep adjusting this person's salary every time his/her market value goes up?
To the second issue, I feel conflicted. Again, a university can't pay you less if your market value goes down... and when you sign on at a university (and especially a department), isn't it understood it's like joining a team? Where's the loyalty? On the other hand, if they can't recognize and compensate you for your improvements, then surely there must be some means of addressing that. And it does leave folks at another university holding the bag -- don't you have to lie to them to proceed on these hiring boondoggles? I think it's probably there that the main problem is -- you leave other departments in the lurch (or at least with shorter resources) if you play them so as to position yourself for a raise. Is the defense that this is how the profession works an effective answer when they ask why you turn the offer down?
A couple of years back the same kind of offer came my way. And it would have been a great step up in many ways professionally. On the downside it was to a red-state part of the country where it's awfully hot and I prefer freezing my ass off in a perennial blue state. The same deal applied though--my university would only match an offer if I had one. Tempting as the offer was--and I agonized on it a week--I could not in good conscience lead my would-be benefactors on with only a mind to staying where I would be a little richer. (I also was an acquaintance of the other U's department head--and how could I lead on someone I liked and respected?) So I turned them down.
The next year I complained bitterly to administration about being put in this position--being valued by a more prestigious institution and having nothing to show for it. So they dipped into a "star-fund" and gave me a $1200 base raise. (My future is now secured! Well--it'll pay for more wine at least.) My take? Don't use offers you know you won't take--but raise hell about having gotten them in the first place.
It seems to me that if you would not go to the other university under any reasonable conditions (meaning ruling out, say, that they pay you 3 times as much and you teach only one grad seminar every other year and things like that), then you should just say no. But if there are reasonable conditions under which you'd consider going, assuming the conditions are not matched by your present institution, why not just present those conditions, see if they will be met, and then see if your home institution will match them. There's nothing dishonest about that so long as the conditions really are such that you'd go if they were met and not matched by your home.
Receiving a competing offer is not the only way to get a decent raise at my university. We have "merit raises": the formula for determining your raise is quite complicated, but VERY roughly, you'll get a ~$1000 raise for each full article you publish in a good journal, and a ~$4500 raise for a book with a major university press.
(Re: 'roughly': the formula for determining merit raises includes literally 50 other possible variables, but articles and books are the biggest determiners.)
Say that University X doesn't have a merit system like the one at Greg's university. The only way University X faculty get increases in salary outside promotion (or taking on certain administrative duties) is through job offers.
What happens when a relatively poorer performing faculty member receives a raise this way?
Notice that in this process University X is using completely external criteria for raising professors' salaries. We tend to think that a professor who merits a job offer at another university automatically has merited their raise, probably exceeding the standards of excellence at their own university. It seems that success on the job market tracks a professor's overall merit. And maybe it does much of the time, though not all the time. The problem is that this way of doing business increases incentive to game the process.
A professor may meet the hiring standards at University Y for a number of reasons particular to Y. University X, where the professor is located, is not in a position to know them fully. Let's say that this professor is offered a raise at University X on account of a job offer from Y. However, the professor is among the poorer performing professors in the department (in scholarship and teaching). Nevertheless, the professor who receives the raise earns more than every other professor in the department. The other members of the department then have incentive to go on the job market themselves, or they can simply accept that they earn less than one of their less productive colleagues. They stand to be rewarded for gaming the job market in order to receive any reward for their harder work, which University X has no way to reward independently of a job offer.
Now, perhaps one would say that a Dean ought to be sensitive to this sort of problem--aware that the professor with the job offer is not performing on par with other members of the department. Only a counter-offer of zero would not "reward" the faculty member. Unfortunately, this is not the response from University X. University x's administration trusts the job market, and the hiring criteria at another university, over their own standards and is never willing to call the bluff of a gaming faculty member. Perhaps, this is because from the administration's perspective it is difficult to identify a gamer, and so all offers are treated similarly. Perhaps, other reasons are involved. At the end of the day, faculty live with the knowledge that at some point they will have to game too (sooner or later) in order to make the same or more money as the (lucky) prof.. (Note: Under Greg's university's merit system, the outcome could be very interesting. University X would have been dedicating funds for a long time to other faculty in the department. Would the administration be forced to examine the conditions of their counter-offers more carefully? )
You have to be careful, at least at the assistant level. Some people in your department may react poorly when they suspect you are sniffing for another job or a pay raise.
Also, I think you can leverage salary with outside offers only a few times before you get a reputation as someone who only uses job offers to get home institution counters. Not only will people think you are an ass, but you will likely never be given serious offers from places if they think you have a nasty habit of not accepting.
Greg:
Many places have merit raises of that sort. I'm talking about major salary increases: 10k plus.
Spiros: I think I see what you're indicating--that job offers (outside promotion) are typically the only way to increase salaries *substantially* and permanently. This seems right, and is part of the problem I was trying to get at. But does the increase even need to be substantial? Isn't the permanence of the salary increase the heart of the matter? The Lucky Professor at University X will always have a higher salary than the other members of the department (however much it the increase is), even if Lucky Prof. never does anything else (ever!). The merit system is nice because it addresses actual productivity (and might encourage it), but unless an increase is permanent, it doesn't compete with the potential value of a job offer (whatever the increase).
Why do you want more money? Do you think it will make you happier? Do you think a few extra bucks would make up for the shame you would feel? If you don't feel shame shouldn't you refuse to do this on the basis of universal reason? If you don't actually want to apply for another job aren't you 'happy enough' in your current job? Aren't you just disturbing your tranquillity and destroying your happiness by trying to drum up Machiavellian tactics to scrounge a few extra lousy dollars? Do you not fear Socrates will knock on the door and start lambasting you for being a sophist?
MalcomZ suggests this is shameful. Hogwash.
The labor market is a *market*. It is not unethical to stop by a clothing store, try on a suit, and decide ultimately not to purchase it. It is not unethical to shop several dealers for a car.
The fact is that the way the tenure system is administered has so fucked up the way hiring could worked, that they've got you hoodwinked.
To ask for a valuation in order to earn what one is actually worth is not a sneaky or misleading strategy. To apply for a job is not to declare you will take the job if offered; it is simply to apply, to ask for consideration.
How to Make More Money in Philosophy? it is so easy.... buying more books!! but it is bad because sometimes the philosophers has made some work with bad quality but they sell a lot of books and earn more money !!!22dd
This was a very useful post. I'm currently investigating the professional aspects of philosophy and posting my findings on a blog. I hope that my research will help educate students coming into the field and those who are already on the job market: http://philosorapters.blogspot.com/
I just posed what I took to be a summery of the comments with a link to this page.
Thanks for the great information,
William Parkhurst,
Thanks it has been a fantastic support, now to make more money in philosophy is without a doubt easy with your recommendation. Thank you
I'm guessing you missed the boat when it comes to people making money for their monetary gain as it is? Does it make you happy that being "fucked up" is the way you live your life? Of course not. So change and look for other ways to make money such as teaching students outside the building about philosophy so they don't have to pay the university for said lessons and you get more money in your pockets. The university can just as easily replace you with someone else.
Tutoring is an easily done thing without books cause kids can buy them online as such without the funding from the universities due to freeware data being virtually in the billions of copies when it comes to books, especially older ones. Think outside the box rather inside your university (cubicle).
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